The EU Anti-Coercion Instrument
The EU's Most Powerful Trade Defence Tool Against US Tariffs
The EU Anti-Coercion Instrument
Analysis of how the EU could deploy its most powerful trade defence tool against US tariffs over Greenland
19 January 2026
Policy Area: Trade Policy & Economic Security
Executive Summary
On Sunday 18 January 2026, US President Donald Trump announced new tariffs of 10% on exports from eight European countries: Denmark, Sweden, France, the Netherlands Finland and Germany of the EU; plus Norway and the United Kingdom. The explicit objective is already known by the Europeans, who have been living under the bullying style of the Trump II administration since January 2025: that of pressuring Denmark to sell Greenland to the United States. The new tariffs' announcement marks an unprecedented use of trade measures to coerce a sovereign nation into ceding territory.
In response, French President Emmanuel Macron and key European Parliament figures (like the INTA chair) have called for the activation of the EU's Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI): a powerful trade defence mechanism adopted in December 2023 that has never been deployed. If activated, the ACI would represent a historic escalation in EU-US trade relations and mark the first time the European Union has formally designated a trading partner as engaging in economic coercion.
This report examines the legal framework of the ACI, the current political context, the procedural steps for activation, the range of countermeasures available to the EU, and the strategic implications for businesses and policymakers.
EU Countries Targeted by Trump's Greenland Tariffs
6 EU Member States face 10% tariffs (rising to 25% by June 2026)
| Country | ISO code | Group | Tariff | Reason | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Denmark | DNK | Targeted by 10% tariff (Feb 2026) | 10% | Greenland sovereignty | Primary target |
| Finland | FIN | Targeted by 10% tariff (Feb 2026) | 10% | NATO exercises in Greenland | Targeted |
| France | FRA | Targeted by 10% tariff (Feb 2026) | 10% | NATO exercises in Greenland | Targeted - Requested ACI |
| Germany | DEU | Targeted by 10% tariff (Feb 2026) | 10% | NATO exercises in Greenland | Targeted |
| Netherlands | NLD | Targeted by 10% tariff (Feb 2026) | 10% | NATO exercises in Greenland | Targeted |
| Sweden | SWE | Targeted by 10% tariff (Feb 2026) | 10% | NATO exercises in Greenland | Targeted |
| Austria | AUT | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Belgium | BEL | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Bulgaria | BGR | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Croatia | HRV | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Cyprus | CYP | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Czechia | CZE | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Estonia | EST | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Greece | GRC | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Hungary | HUN | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Ireland | IRL | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Italy | ITA | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Latvia | LVA | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Lithuania | LTU | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Luxembourg | LUX | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Malta | MLT | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Poland | POL | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Portugal | PRT | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Romania | ROU | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Slovakia | SVK | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Slovenia | SVN | Other EU-27 (not targeted) | |||
| Spain | ESP | Other EU-27 (not targeted) |
27 rows
1. What Is the Anti-Coercion Instrument?
1.1 Legal framework
The Anti-Coercion Instrument (Regulation 2023/2675) entered into force on 27 December 2023. It was designed to protect EU member states and the Union itself, and as a whole, from economic coercion by third countries, situations where a non-EU country uses trade or investment measures to pressure the EU or its member states into making specific policy choices. Situations like the current one with Trump.
According to the European Commission, economic coercion occurs when a third country "is seeking to pressure the Union or a Member State into making a particular choice by applying-or threatening to apply-measures affecting trade or investment."
The instrument was conceived amid rising geopolitical tensions and the increasing weaponisation of trade by major powers. While initially focused on risks from China, including threats against Lithuania over its relationship with Taiwan, the changing transatlantic relationship now places the United States squarely within its potential scope. The ACI was also created as a "just-in-case" legal tool during the Biden administration, since at the time of its proposal by the Commission (2021) it was not clear whether Biden would continue, a Democrat would inherit his seat, or Trump would come back. Also, even if Biden's stances on the EU were way less aggressive, the American trade policy towards the EU did not change in the depth that EU officials expected (especially as regards to the US stances in the WTO).
The ACI did not come alone. It is one of the so called "unilateral instruments" taken by the Union to enforce its trade policy unilaterally. The sister law of the ACI is the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Instrument (Regulation 2019/452), whose rapporteur was another heavy-weight MEP, Christophe Hansen (Luxembourg, EPP, today the EU's commissioner for Agriculture and Food).
The chair of the European Parliament's Committee on International Trade (INTA), one of the most powerful committees of that institution (because international trade is an exclusive competence of the Union, although the EP can't propose laws), Bernd Lange (Germany, SPD, S&D) was its rapporteur, which gives a hint on the importance given to this piece of legislation. Lange is a senior Member of the EP, having chaired INTA for more than a decade. No wonder that he was the first MEP, on Sunday 18 January 2026, to ask for the deployment of the ACI.
1.2 Primary objectives of the ACI
The ACI (pronounced "ah-cee") has three principal objectives:
Deterrence: the existence of the instrument is intended to discourage third countries from engaging in coercive practices in the first place.
Response: where coercion occurs, the ACI provides a legal framework for imposing countermeasures ("unilateral instrument", remember?).
Reparation: the instrument can be used to pursue compensation for injury caused by coercive measures.
2. The current context: Trump's Greenland tariffs
On Sunday 18 January 2026, President Trump announced via his X-like Truth Social that all products from Denmark, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Finland would be subject to an additional 10% tariff starting Sunday 1 February 2026. The tariff would increase to 25% by Monday 1 June 2026 unless "a Deal is reached for the Complete and Total purchase of Greenland."
The announcement followed the deployment of troops from these countries to Greenland for joint training exercises at Denmark's request. Trump characterised these exercises as threatening to global security, despite them being conducted under NATO frameworks.
The Greenland tariffs represent a textbook case of economic coercion under the ACI framework for several reasons:
Explicit policy objective: Trump has openly stated the tariffs are designed to force territorial concessions.
Interference with sovereignty: the measures seek to influence Denmark's sovereign decisions regarding its territory.
Punitive character: the escalating nature of the tariffs (10% to 25%) demonstrates intent to inflict increasing economic harm until demands are met.
Breach of existing agreements: the tariffs contradict the EU-US trade deal concluded in July 2025.
European leaders have responded with unprecedented unity and determination, starting with France's President Macron, who has formally requested activation of the ACI on France's behalf (Macron tends to like to play EU hardball). Commission President von der Leyen stated that Europeans will respond in a "united and coordinated manner", although the typical "deeply concerned" statement always flies over the Commission's stances. At the European Parliament, we've already seen that Bernd Lange spoke up, as well as Manfred Weber (EPP leader, from Germany) called for freezing the EU-US trade deal ratification (something quite big, coming from the EPP).
Of course this new Trump obsession with Greenland is also rooted to the successful apprehension of Venezuela's president Nicolás Maduro. The fact that Trump has been dismissing María Corina Machado, one of the leaders of the Venezuelan opposition, and has preferred to work with the deputy of Maduro, Delcy Rodríguez, from the Marxist aristocracy of Caracas, might have also created some antipathy in the ranks of the EPP: the father of another leader of the Venezuelan opposition, Leopoldo López Gil (father of Leopoldo López Mendoza, imprisoned by the regime from 2015 to 2020, when he fled to Madrid), is an MEP for the Spanish PP, one of the top parties within EPP. The relationship of the EPP, through its Spanish member organisation, with the Venezuelan opposition is quite strong. It was the EPP who pushed for the recognition of Juan Guaidó as president of Venezuela in 2021 (the Parliament's president at the time was Antonio Tajani), something that pretty nobody remembers now.
So yes, Venezuela and Greenland are connected in several ways.
3. How would the ACI be activated?
The ACI follows a structured process with built-in opportunities for dialogue before countermeasures are imposed:
| Stage | Action | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Initiation | Commission examines potential coercion (own initiative or member state request) | Typically 4 months for examination |
| 2. Determination | Council decides (by implementing act) whether coercion has occurred | 8-10 weeks for Council decision |
| 3. Engagement | EU seeks dialogue with third country to cease coercion | No fixed timeline; parallel to examination |
| 4. Response | Commission adopts countermeasures via implementing act | Within 6 months of determination; can be expedited |
The timeline can be compressed in urgent cases, and given the explicit nature of Trump's coercion, the EU may choose to fast-track the procedure.
4. Available EU response measures
The ACI provides the Commission with an exceptionally broad range of countermeasures. This flexibility allows the EU to calibrate its response to maximise effectiveness while trying to minimise collateral damage to European businesses and consumers (that remains to be seen).
Some trade measures are:
Import restrictions: increased tariffs or quantitative restrictions on US goods entering the EU.
Export restrictions: controls on EU exports of critical goods or services to the US.
Services restrictions: limitations on US services providers operating in the EU market.
Market access measures include:
Public procurement exclusions: US companies could be barred from participating in EU public tenders.
Licensing restrictions: refusal or delay of authorisations needed for US companies to operate in regulated sectors.
Product standards: enhanced scrutiny of US products under chemical, sanitary, or safety regulations.
Finally, investment and financial measures are as follows:
FDI restrictions: limitations on US direct investment in the EU, particularly in strategic sectors.
Financial market access: restrictions on US financial institutions' access to EU markets.
Intellectual property: measures affecting US intellectual property rights within the EU.
5. Strategic considerations
Several factors argue strongly in favour of ACI activation:
Credibility: the ACI's deterrent value depends on willingness to use it. Failure to act now would signal that the EU's "trade bazooka" is merely rhetorical. And we know that firing a bazooka is very dangerous: it could burn the shooter badly.
Precedent: as noted by Bruegel researchers, "not responding to coercion would fundamentally weaken the EU as a geopolitical actor." Some would say that the EU has already accepted going through the path of weakness due to the different and diverse interests of its Member States.
Clear-cut case: Trump's explicit linking of tariffs to territorial demands leaves no ambiguity about coercive intent.
European unity: the current political moment offers rare cross-party and cross-national consensus for strong action.
Nevertheless, there are risks and serious concerns regarding the use of such "bazooka":
Escalation risk: the Trump administration has shown willingness to escalate trade conflicts significantly. Trump already said "sanctions" is one of his favourite words (meaning: "I enjoy bullying").
Economic impact: a full-scale trade war would harm European exporters and consumers, something that is already happening, as seen in the affordability crisis we all suffer.
NATO implications: trade confrontation could further strain the transatlantic security alliance (something that the current Vance-like Republican Party already wishes to see).
Internal divisions: some member states (notably Italy) have expressed reservations about escalation (reminder: Giorga Meloni personally, and Fratelli d'Italia as an organisation, enjoy very good relations with Trump, his court, and the current GOP).
There are alternative options for the ACI deployment, though. The EU has prepared a €100 billion package of retaliatory tariffs that was suspended following the July 2025 trade deal in Scotland between von der Leyen and Trump. This suspension expires on Saturday 7 February 2026 unless extended. The Commission could implement the suspended tariff package as an immediate response, without full ACI activation; suspend ratification of the EU-US trade deal in the European Parliament while pursuing dialogue; or even initiate an ACI examination while keeping countermeasures in reserve as negotiating leverage. As we see, all of these are "wait-and-see" measures meant to gain time within a negotiation for de-escalation.
ACI Activation TimelinePOTENTIAL
Procedural steps under Regulation 2023/2675
Commission examines potential coercion (own initiative or member state request). France has formally requested activation.
Council decides (by implementing act) whether coercion has occurred. Would formally designate US as engaging in economic coercion.
EU seeks dialogue with third country to cease coercion. Runs parallel to examination; may continue during response phase.
Commission adopts countermeasures via implementing act. Can include tariffs, procurement exclusions, FDI restrictions, and more.
6. Implications for businesses
The immediate concerns for businesses are:
European exporters to the US in the eight targeted countries face immediate cost increases and potential market access issues.
US companies operating in the EU should monitor ACI proceedings for potential restrictions on market access, public procurement participation, or regulatory treatment.
Supply chain dependencies on either US or EU inputs require urgent review given potential disruption scenarios.
US Sectors Exposed to ACI Countermeasures
Potential targets for EU procurement exclusions and market access restrictions
| Sector | Key Companies | EU Exposure | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| Defence | Lockheed Martin, RTX, Boeing, Northrop Grumman | F-35 (8 countries), Patriot, GBAD contracts | High |
| Cloud Services | Microsoft, Amazon (AWS), Google Cloud | Office 365, Azure, Cloud II contracts | High |
| Consulting | McKinsey, Deloitte, PwC, Accenture | EU institution advisory contracts | Medium |
| Medical Devices | Johnson & Johnson, Medtronic, Abbott | EU healthcare system supplies | Medium |
| Construction | Bechtel, Fluor, AECOM | EU infrastructure projects | Lower |
| Energy & Utilities | GE, Honeywell | Power generation, grid equipment | Medium |
7. US companies that could be hit by ACI
The largest and most strategically sensitive sector is defence. US defence contractors supply equipment, systems, and services to European NATO allies and EU Member States.
| Company | EU exposure |
|---|---|
| Lockheed Martin | F-35 programme (8 EU countries); missile systems; NATO GBAD contracts via Lockheed Martin UK |
| RTX (Raytheon) | Patriot missile systems (Europe's primary ballistic missile defence); €1.7bn Spain contract (Dec 2025); Collins Aerospace components |
| Boeing | Military aircraft (F-15, Apache helicopters); satellite systems; GPS; defence electronics |
| Northrop Grumman | Surveillance systems; missile warning satellites; unmanned systems; cyber defence |
| General Dynamics | IT systems for European defence agencies; land systems; communications |
Note: defence procurement is governed by Directive 2009/81/EC. ACI measures could delay or block new contracts, spare parts, and maintenance agreements, though existing contracts would likely be honoured.
Another industry that could be hit directly is cloud services: US hyperscalers dominate EU public sector cloud and software contracts (even EU institutions rely massively, and almost uniquely, on US clouds such as Google Cloud, Microsoft Azure, or Amazon Web Services). The European Data Protection Supervisor has already raised concerns about EU institutions' reliance on US cloud providers.
| Company | EU public sector exposure |
|---|---|
| Microsoft | Office 365 used by EU institutions; Azure cloud (Cloud II contracts); dominant in member state government IT |
| Amazon (AWS) | Cloud II contracts with EU bodies; UK G-Cloud framework; member state cloud infrastructure |
| Google Cloud | Growing EU public sector presence; data analytics; AI services for government agencies |
| Oracle / IBM | Enterprise software; database systems; legacy government IT infrastructure |
Other exposed sectors are
- Construction and engineering: US firms (Bechtel, Fluor, AECOM) bid on major EU infrastructure projects;
- Medical devices: Johnson & Johnson, Medtronic, Abbott supply EU healthcare systems;
- Consulting and professional services: big consultancies such as McKinsey, Deloitte, PwC, Accenture advise EU institutions and Member States, in a policy symbiosis where these big firms fill the gaps in expertise and human resources of the EU institutions, especially the Commission, whose numerus clausus of officials has grown dramatically in the last decade;
- Energy and utilities: GE or Honeywell supply power generation and grid equipment.
Procurement exclusions would apply to new contracts, but existing agreements would very likely be honoured by the Commission. US subsidiaries incorporated in the EU may have different treatment than direct US bidders: in the end, these subsidiaries are functioning as European companies albeit having an American matrix. Also, ACI measures would be temporary, lifted once coercion from Trump and his court ends.
8. Conclusion
The Greenland tariff crisis represents a watershed moment for EU trade policy. Trump's explicit use of tariffs to coerce territorial concessions from a sovereign nation and NATO ally is precisely the scenario the Anti-Coercion Instrument was designed to address.
With French President Macron formally requesting activation and cross-party support in the European Parliament, the political conditions for deploying the EU's most powerful trade defence tool are now aligned. Whether the Commission and Council will take this historic step, and how the Trump administration would respond, remains to be seen.
What is clear is that the era of treating economic coercion as a phenomenon primarily associated with China is over. The EU's economic security framework must now account for the possibility, indeed, the reality, that the United States is prepared to weaponise trade against its closest allies.
Beresol will continue to monitor developments in this critical policy area. For tailored analysis of how these trade tensions may affect your organisation, contact our EU Public Affairs team.
You can also have a look at Beresol's Tariff & Trade War Monitor to see how things are right now.
Sources
European Commission, "Q&A regarding the Anti-Coercion Instrument" (2024)
Regulation (EU) 2023/2675 (Anti-Coercion Instrument)
García Bercero, I. and Poitiers, N., "From strategy to doctrine: the next steps for European economic security," Bruegel Policy Brief 32/2025
García Bercero, I., "What can Europe do to mitigate economic security risks?" Bruegel Newsletter, December 2025
Fortune, Bloomberg, Euronews, NBC News, The Hill - news coverage, January 2026
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Analysis of how the EU could deploy its Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) against Trump's Greenland tariffs. Examines the legal framework, activation timeline, available countermeasures, and strategic implications for businesses. It is a free, open-access analysis published by Beresol, a software company specialised in EU matters.
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